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Abstract
In this paper, we use the traditional herding measure of Lakonishok, Shleifer
and Vishny (1992) (LSV indicator) and a more recent measure by Frey, Herbst
and Walter (2007) (FHW indicator) in order to assess the intensity of herding
by French equity mutual funds and to compare it to institutional herding in
other stock markets. We show that when measured with the LSV indicator,
institutional herding by French equity funds amounts to 6.5%, which is larger
than those reported by other empirical studies on developed stock markets.
Our ndings also suggest that herding does not monotonically rises with the
number of investors trading on a stock-quarter. We also obtain that FHW
herding levels are about 2.5 times stronger than those obtained with the tra-
ditional LSV measure. Our other results are consistent with those reported
by most previous works on developed stock markets. In particular, we observe
that herding is stronger in small capitalization than in medium and large capi-
talization. Moreover herding turns out to be more severe among foreign stocks
than among UE-15 or French stocks. Finally, French institutional investors
practice feedback strategies: they buy past winners and sell past losers.
JEL Classication: G11, G23
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Herding is a behavior that consists in imitating other agents' actions. Although it
is refered to in many elds of economics, herding is particularly often invoked to
explain nancial market anomalies such as the excessive volatility of asset prices or
the emergence of nancial bubbles. Herding can be practiced by analysts when they
issue recommandations or forecasts about assets' prices or rms' earnings but also
by investors when they make transactions in nancial markets. Among the latter,
institutional investors such as funds, banks or insurance companies now carry a
very important weight in nancial markets. They are also considered as particularly
prone to herding. First, they are better informed than individuals about other market
participants' transactions. Second, they are particularly sensitive to eects described
in the theoretical literature on herding. On the one hand, as explained by Scharfstein
& Stein (1990), fund managers do not know their own skill level. They thus herd
so that wrong allocation decisions can be attributed to a bad common signal rather
than to a lack of skill. On the other hand, in accordance with agency models (Maug
& Naik (1996)), relative performance-based payment schemes entice fund managers
to herd towards the market index in order to make sure of their payo1.
There now exists an abundant empirical literature on institutional herding. A
rst strand of the literature associates institutional herding to large variations of
stocks' holding by institutional investors (Nofsinger & Sias (1999), Kim & Sias (2005),
Dasgupta, Prat & Verardo (2007), Sias, Starks & Titman (2007)). Data sets used in
these studies only provide the nature of the stocks' owner (institutional or individual)
but not his precise identity. This brings a limit of these studies since transactions
on large quantities of stocks by a small number of institutional investors can be
misinterpreted as herding.
The second stream of literature, in the line of Lakonishok, Shleifer & Vishny
(1992), is based on portfolio data. It measures herding as an excessive concentration
of transactions on the same side of the market for particular stocks. This literature
mainly focuses on American as well as on German and UK mutual and pension
funds (Lakonishok et al. (1992), Grinblatt, Titman & Wermers (1995), Oehler (1998),
Wermers (1999), Oehler & Chao (2000), Wylie (2005), Haigh, Boyd & Buyuksahin
(2006) and Puckett & Yan (2007))2. Due to its 
exibility of implementation, the
indicator proposed by Lakonishok et al. (1992) allows interesting renement in the
analysis of institutional herding. It notably allows to study herding among sub-
categories of stocks or funds. It can also be easily used to examine feedback trading
strategies as well as the impact of institutional herding on stocks' returns. Among
1For very complete reviews of the theoretical literature on herding, see Bikhchandani & Sharma
(2001) and Hirshleifer & Teoh (2003).
2A few studies have also been conducted on smaller nancial markets such as the Polish
(Voronkova & Bohl (2005)), the Portuguese (Loboa & Serra (2002)) and the Finnish market (Do,





































0various arguments put forward against this indicator, the critics by Frey, Herbst &
Walter (2007) appears particularly interesting. Resorting to simulations, the authors
argue that Lakonishok et al. (1992) underevaluate herding. They thus propose an
alternative indicator based on the dierence between the empirical variance and the
theoretical variance under the assumption of no herding. Applying their indicator to
a data set of German mutual funds, they show that herding turns out to be higher
than measured with the LSV indicator.
Although a large empirical literature has developed on institutional herding, stud-
ies on herding by French institutional investors are still missing. This is mainly due
to the fact that portfolio data on French institutional investors have never been
available till now. The goal of this paper is to ll this gap. We make use of a to-
tally new data set provided by the Banque de France containing 1 891 French equity
OPCVM (Organismes de Placement Collectif en Valeurs Mobili eres) between March
1999 and June 2004. OPCVM are collective management entities that encompass
SICAV (Soci et e d'Investissement  a CApital Variable) and FCP (Fonds Communs de
Placement). Mainly controled by banks and insurance companies, OPCVM have a
very important success, notably with households. Mutual funds are now among the
most signicant investors in French nancial markets. Their assets under manage-
ment amounts to about 1 245 billions euros for OPCVM as a whole and 200 billions
for equity OPCVM at the end of 2008 (source: Association Fran caise de Gestion,
AFG3).
In this paper, we use the traditional indicator by Lakonishok et al. (1992) and
the recent indicator by Frey et al. (2007) in order to measure the intensity of herd-
ing by French OPCVM and to compare it to institutional herding in other nancial
places. We show that when measured with the LSV indicator, institutional herding
by french OPCVM amounts to 6.5%, which is larger than those reported by other
empirical studies on developed stock markets. Our ndings also suggest that herding
does not monotonically rises with the number of investors trading on a stock-quarter.
However, it signicantly rises when funds considerably change the quantity of a given
stock. Whe also obtain that FHW herding levels are about 2.5 times stronger than
those obtained with the traditional LSV measure. Our other main ndings are con-
sistent with those reported by most previous works on developed stock markets.
In particular, although some herding is also observed in large capitalization stocks,
herding is stronger in small capitalization than in medium capitalization. More-
over herding turns out to be more severe among foreign stocks than among UE-15
or French stocks. Finally, French institutional investors practice positive feedback
strategies: they buy past winners and sell past losers.
The article is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews the empirical literature
based on the indicator proposed by Lakonishok et al. (1992). In Section 3, we give






































0details about our data and methodology. Results are exposed in Section 4. In Section
5, we provide some extensions. Section 6 concludes.
2 Institutional herding in the empirical literature
2.1 Institutional herding as an excessive concentration of
transactions on particular stocks
The most widely used measure of institutional herding is the index proposed by
Lakonishok et al. (1992) (below denoted by "LSV indicator"). It is dened as follows:
HLSV;i;t =j
Bi;t
ni;t   pt j  E j
~ Bi;t
ni;t   pt j where Bi;t is the number of institutional
buyers of the stock i in t, ni;t the total number of institutional sellers and buyers of
the stock i in t, and pt the probability for an institutional investor to be a buyer in
t. As we will see in the next section, the implementation of HLSV;i;t requires precise
portfolio data, indicating by which institutional investor each stock of the data set
is bought or sold.
HLSV;i;t measures the excess of selling or buying transactions' similarity. The
rst term of HLSV;i;t measures the propensity of the stock i to be more intensively
bought or sold by institutional investors than all stocks as a whole. It is corrected
by the second term, which accounts for the natural dispersion of stock transactions
by institutional investors. This natural dispersion is dened as the outcome of a
binomial distribution, with probability pt and a number of drawings ni;t.
HLSV;i;t = 0 means there is no herding among institutional investors while HLSV;i;t >
0 indicates herding behavior; the higher HLSV;i;t, the stronger herding. For instance,
if the proportion of institutional buyers is 50%, HLSV;i;t = 0:10 indicates that, in t,
the proportion of institutional buyers of the stock i is 40% while the proportion of
institutional sellers is 60%. An average indicator HLSV can also be implemented in
order to measure institutional herding on the whole market and over the wole data
set period.
2.2 The intensity of institutional herding: determinants and
implications
The index HLSV has mainly been used in the case of equity transactions by American
pension and mutual funds. As shown in Table 1, the resort to HLSV has then been
extented in terms of geographical area, as well as in terms of stock and institutional
investor categories.
3This probability is estimated as the weighted means of
Bi;t








































0The rst ndings of this empirical literature is that institutional herding is very
weak in American and Western European markets. It is higher in emerging but
also in Finnish, Portuguese and Polish markets because of information opaqueness
(Loboa & Serra (2002)), high ownership concentration (Do et al. (2006)) or stock
regulation and institutional investor concentration (Borensztein & Gelos (2001)).
Lakonishok et al. (1992), Wermers (1999), Voronkova & Bohl (2005), Do et al.
(2006) also establish that small rm stocks are particularly prone to herding behavior.
For example, Lakonishok et al. (1992) show that HLSV equals 6.1% for lowest market-
capitalization quantile rms while it is only 1.6% for top market-capitalization quan-
tile rms. Information asymetries may also entail stronger herding on stocks issued
by TIC rms. This is conrmed by Sharma, Easterwood & Kumar (2005) who show
that HLSV is 6.58% for Internet businesses between 1998 and 2001, against 3.86%
on the whole american equity market.
Grinblatt et al. (1995) establish that herding by income funds (0.88%) is weaker
than herding by growth funds (1.55%) because imitation is particularly attractive for
funds whose allocation style is based on rms' fundamental value assessment. Kim
& Wei (2001) and Borensztein & Gelos (2001) also obtain that herding is stronger
among on-shore than among o-shore funds, the latter being less transparent and
more dicult to imitate.
Finally, the LSV indicator has also been used to study feedback trading strate-
gies, which consist in buying high past-return stocks and selling low past-return ones.
Grinblatt et al. (1995), Wermers (1999) and Sharma et al. (2005) conrm the exis-
tence of feedback trading by american funds. The 'buy herding measure' (the value
of HLSV;it;t conditionned on
Bi;t
ni;t > pt) is higher for stocks with high performance
during the previous quarter while the 'sell herding measure' (the value of HLSV;i;t
conditioned on
Bi;t
ni;t < pt) is higher for those who had poor performance. Obtaining
opposite results for UK mutual funds, Wylie (2005) concludes they have contrarian
strategies.
2.3 Bias in institutional herding measure
The main argument put forward against the LSV indicator is that it may be biased
downward4. First, the under-evaluation of herding behavior may also come from a
4Wylie (2005) suggests that the indicator HLSV could also be biased upward. By construction,
HLSV does not account for the prohibition of short-selling (a practice that consist in selling a
stock without owning it rst) in many nancial places. As this reglementary constraint implies
a left-truncation of the ~ Bi;t's distribution, herding behavior may be over-evaluated. To make the
constraint inoperative, Wylie (2005) calculates HLSV only on the subset of stocks initially owned





































0Reference Period Stocks Institutional investor HLSV
Lakonishok et al. (1992) 01/1985-12/1989t Equities 769 American pension funds 2.7%
Grinblatt et al. (1995) 01/1974-12/1984t Equities 274 American mutual funds 2.5%
Oehler (1998) 01/1988-06/1993s Equities 28 German mutual funds 2.9%
Wermers (1999) 01/1975-12/1994t Equities All American mutual fonds 3.4%
Oehler & Chao (2000) 01/1993-12/1995s Bonds 57 German mutual funds 2.6%
Borensztein & Gelos (2001) 01/1996-03/1999m Equities 467 emerging country mutual funds 7,2%
Loboa & Serra (2002) 01/1998-12/2000t Equities 32 Potuguese mutual funds 11.38%
Wylie (2005) 01/1986-12/1993s Equities 268 UK mutual funds 2.6%
Voronkova & Bohl (2005) 01/1999-12/2002a Equities 17 Polish mutual funds 22.6%
Haigh et al. (2006) 01/2002-09/2006q Futures American hedge funds 9%
01/2002-09/2006q Futures American brokers and traders 7%
Do et al. (2006) 03/1995-05/2004m Equities 32 Finnish banks, mutual funds and brokers 9.9%
Puckett & Yan (2007) 01/1999-12/2004h Equities 776 American mutual and pension funds 3.78%
Frey et al. (2007) 01/1998-12/2004b Equities German mutual funds 4.43%
Mentions "d", "w", "m", "q", "b" et "a" in the second column indicate respectively daily, weekly, monthly, quarterly, biannual
and annual data. All values reported in the last column are signicant.
Table 1: HLSV estimates in the empirical literature
too small number of transactions. If there exists a positive relationship between the
intensity of market activity and the level of herding, calculating HLSV with small
values of ni;t may bias the indicator downward. Lakonishok et al. (1992), Grinblatt
et al. (1995), Wermers (1999), Loboa & Serra (2002) and Wylie (2005) provide the
values taken by HLSV when the transaction number below which stocks are excluded
from its calculation is progressively reduced. But only Grinblatt et al. (1995) and
Wylie (2005) report a monotonic (and positive) relationship between the indicator
and the level of the parameter ni;t. For instance, in Wylie (2005), HLSV = 2:5% for
ni;t  5 and HLSV = 9% for ni;t  25.
Second, according to Oehler (1998), the substraction by pt purges the indicator
from an important dimension of institutional herding, which is the funds' propensity
to be massively sellers or buyers, all stocks taken together. Moreover, herding can
be weak when measured in terms of number of buyers or of sellers but much higher




BVi;t+SVi;t j   j
~ BV   ~ SV
~ BV + ~ SV j where BVi;t and SVi;t are respectively the buy-
ing volume and the selling volume on the stock i in t while ~ BVi;t and ~ SVi;t are the
transactions' probabilities to be a buying transaction and a selling transaction re-
spectively. Measured with this new indicator, herding turns out to be much stronger:
in Oehler (1998), HO hovers from 78% and 83% according to the estimation period
while in Oehler & Chao (2000), it equals 86.2%. However, the denition of market-
wide herding by Oehler (1998) and Oehler & Chao (2000) is so large that it may
capture many market features that have nothing to do with herding phenomena.
Finally, an interesting development on herding measurement is provided by Frey
et al. (2007). Resorting to simulations, they conrm that the LSV indicator un-
derevaluates herding and propose an alternative indicator (below denoted 'FHW





































0Apllied to a set of German mutual funds between 1998 to 2004, the FHW indicator
provides a herding measure 2.8 times higher than the one obtained with the LSV
indicator.
3 Data
To study institutional herding in the French stock market, we rely on a completely
new data set provided by the Banque de France. It contains quarterly portfolio data
about 1 891 French equity OPCVM between the rst quarter of 1999 and the third
quarter of 2005. This represents a total of 20 182 shares i.e. 192 804 stock-quarters.
Some equities are quoted only a few times while some others are quoted more than
5 000 times. As we will see now, the structure of the data set is well suited for the
implementation of LSV and FHW indicators.
First, for each stock, the data set indicates the weight of the stock in the OPCVM's
portfolio, the growth rate of the stock's price and the growth rate of the fund's net
value. These information are important because they allow us to compute the so-
called 'Growth Rate of the Stocks' Number' (below denoted 'GRSN'), which tries to
evaluate whether a transaction on a given stock is 'important' or not from the fund's
point of view. It is calculated as the absolute value of the quarter-on-quarter growth
rate of the number of a given stock for a given fund. In the following sections, we
investigate whether herding intensity depends on the intensity of a stock transaction
for a fund. To do this we successively compute herding indicators on subsamples
excluding tradings with low intensity from the fund's point of view, i.e. for which
jGRSNj > k, with k = 0, k = 0:05, k = 0:1 and k = 0:15 respectively (a higher
threshold k corresponds to a stronger trading intensity5)6.
Other interesting informations are also available. They will allow us to investigate
whether herding depend on stocks' characteristics. The data set is segregated into
three groups according stocks' capitalization: large capitalization, medium capital-
ization and small capitalization7. The geographical origin of stocks is also provided
(French stocks, UE-15 stocks and foreign stocks). The , the quarter-on-quarter
return and the price-to-book-ratio of each stocks are also available.
Finally, the initial data set has been processed in order to exclude stocks for
which information or data are missing. For example, GRSN can be calculated for
5Funds which introduce a new stock (GRSN = +1) or liquidate their position (GRSN =  1)
are never excluded by the threshold.
6The main drawback of this measure is its sensitivity to the initial holding level. More precise
information about sold and bought stocks would have allowed us to compute a more relevant
measure.






































0only 155 492 of them. We also exclude equities for which there exists at least one
quarter during which there is only one buyer or one seller. At the end of this process,
we have a usable data set of 101 886 stock-quarters. The characteristics of this nal
data set are depicted in Table 2.
Quarter Number of stocks by quarter
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005
1 3 277 3 335 3 489 3 980 4 522 5 135
2 2 598 3 335 3 369 3 764 4 330 4 658 5 422
3 2 674 3 323 3 432 3 793 4 327 4 633 5 546
4 2 760 3 387 3 507 3 838 4 410 5 042
On-stock average number of funds by quarter
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005
1 17.0 19.9 21.1 19.9 19.2 18.2
2 14.7 17.4 20.1 20.4 19.5 18.5 1.8
3 14.9 18.1 20.4 20.3 19.8 18.2 18.5
4 15.2 19.2 20.4 20.2 19.5 17.6
Number of stock-quarters by capitalization-category
Large capitalization Medium capitalization Small capitalization
31 923 56 591 52 397
Number of stock-quarters by geographical origin-category
French UE-15 Foreign
17 655 23 811 60 420
Table 2: Description of the data set
4 Results
First, we discuss the overall levels of herding by French institutional investors as
measured by the LSV indicator. Second, we investigate whether herding intensity
changes with stock characteristics and compare our results with those of studies
applying the LSV indicator to compared developed stock markets.
4.1 Overall herding levels
Table 3 summarizes the results we obtain through applying the LSV herding measure
to the French institutional investors in our sample. The average herding levels are
computed over all stock-quarters which were traded by at least ve investors. We
follow Wermers (1999) and impose a hurdle of ve institutional investors trading on





































0trading in the same direction do not seem to qualify as a herd8.
Table 3 reveals interesting facts. First, the overall level of herding is 6.50%. This
result can be interpreted as meaning that if 100 French institutional investors trade
a given stock in a given period, then approximately 6 more investors end up on
the same side of the market than would be expected if all investors take their deci-
sions randomly and independently. This level of herding is signicantly higher than
those obtained by previous empirical investigations implementing the LSV herding
measure to comparable developed stock markets such as the US, UK and Germany
(Lakonishok et al. (1992), Oehler (1998), Grinblatt et al. (1995), Wermers (1999),
Wylie (2005) and Puckett & Yan (2007)). This nding can partly be explained by
the singularities and institutional dierences between the French stock market and
the other developed stock markets. In particular, the French market is highly con-
centrated and most funds are provided by banks and insurance companies9. This
strong concentration could encourage mimetic behaviors and thus leads to higher
herding levels in the French stock market.
Second, our ndings suggest that institutional investors herding in France is
slightly higher when the number of investors trading on a stock-quarter increases.
Similar conclusions have been reported by several previous empirical investigations
on institutional herding (Grinblatt et al. (1995) and Wylie (2005)). These ndings
suggest that the incentive to herd for reputation reasons might be comparatively
higher when a large number of other institutional investors are also strongly active
in a given stock-quarter. Furthermore, it seems that French institutional investors
infer stronger informational signals and disregard their own private information when
the number of traders and/or the trading activity in a stock-quarter increase. They
may face a considerable reputational cost from acting dierent from the herd: it is
more costly to be alone and wrong than to be with the herd and wrong.
Our ndings also show that herding is more pronounced when the growth rate of
stocks' number is high. For instance, for stocks traded at least by 10 investors, the
herding measure grows from 6.6% when jGRSNj > 0 to almost the double 13.80%
when jGRSNj > 0:15.
Finally, we should mention that the herding measures in Table 3 provide aggre-
gate herding levels over all stock-quarters regardless of the characteristics of these
stocks. Therefore, a thorough analysis of dierent samples is necessary to a better
understanding of institutional herding in the French stock market10.
8Note that herding measures computed over all stock-quarters traded by at least one French
institutional investor, not reported here but available upon request from the authors, show too
little dierences with the results we discuss in the paper.
9According to the AFG, the asset management companies (funds families) controlled by banking
or insurance groups (some 200 companies among the 500 existing companies), represent 95 % of
assets under management.






































k = 0 k = 0:05 k = 0:1 k = 0:15
ni;t > 5 6.5% 11% 12.5% 12.3%
(50249) (28 309) (25 318) (24 747)
ni;t > 10 6.6% 11.4% 13.2% 13%
(32 482) (15 511) (13 410) (12 984)
ni;t > 15 6.7% 11.7% 13.8% 13.4%
(23 881) (10 271) (8 680 ) (8 358 )
ni;t > 20 6.9% 12% 14.3% 13.8%
(18 557) (7 457) (6 115) (5 880)
Figures in brackets indicate the number of quarter-stocks.
Table 3: Estimates of HLSV
4.2 Herding intensity and stocks' characteristics
4.2.1 Herding intensity and stocks' market capitalization
We rst examine whether institutional herding in the French stock market varies
with the size of rms11. Thus, based on rms market capitalization, we segregate
our stock-quarters sample into three groups: large, medium and small rms. In
theory, we should expect higher herding for small rms because investors receive
less information from these rms. Moreover, according to Wermers (1999), informa-
tional cascades are more likely among small rms because institutional investors put
a relatively larger weight on what the herd is doing and less weight on their own
noisy private information. Therefore, institutional herding arises from inferring in-
formation from each others trades (informational cascades) and the average herding
should be higher in small capitalization stocks. Furthermore, institutional investors
may share a strong aversion to small capitalization stocks (Falkenstein (1996)). The
agency theory can equally be used to justify a higher expected herding in small
capitalization stocks. In this theory, the basic rule is that 'it is better to fail conven-
tionally than to succeed unconventionally'. Thus, institutional investors should be
more sensible to holding small, bad performing stocks than to holding large, bad per-
forming stocks, since the latter are held by many concurrent institutional investors.
we have applied LSV measure during three sub-periods: before, during and after the crash. One
would assume that herding on the buy-side may be higher in times of bull markets, driving asset
prices away from theoretical values. Alternatively, herding on the sell-side may be bigger in times of
bear markets because of competition between institutional investors. However, our ndings reveal
no signicant dierences. In other words, French institutional herding was not more pronounced
during the internet crash than during the calm period.
11Our tests, not reported here but available upon request from authors, show that herding is not





































0Therefore, herding is likely to be higher in small capitalization stocks12. Finally,
as short-selling impossibility mainly aects small capitalization stocks, that kind of
constraint may also explain more severe herding (on the buying side) among small
capitalization stocks.
Table 4 shows, as expected, that institutional investors herding in the French
stock market is larger for small capitalization stocks than for large ones. The more
fund trading intensity assessed by jGRSNj, the larger the dierence between herding
in small and large capitalization stocks. The evidence is less clear according to
the number of traders. However, when the fund trading intensity is high (high
|GRSN|), institutional herding in small capitalization stocks sharply rises with
number of traders. For instance, whenjGRSNj > 0:15, the level of herding in small
stocks traded by at least 20 managers is 20.9% , whereas in small stock traded by
at least 5 managers it is only 15.2%. On the other hand, our ndings reveal that
institutional herding in the French stock market is higher for large stocks than for
medium stocks. This result may partly arise from correlated signals (investigative
herding). In fact, Sias (2004) establishes that correlation between signals is higher in
large stocks with less noisy signals because institutional investors use same indicators.
Furthermore, institutional investors share similar preferences for liquidity and size,
such that high herding can be observed in large capitalization stocks (Gompers &
Metrick (2001) and Pinnuck (2004)). Taken together, our results suggest that herding
is consistent with the preference of institutional investors to hold large capitalization
stocks. But due to information asymmetries and similar preferences, these investors
strongly imitate others in trading the smaller stocks.
12This can explain why small rms are massively sold by fund managers before performance







































k = 0 k = 0:05 k = 0:1 k = 0:15
ni;t > 5 6.7% 11.1% 12.6% 12.2%
(17 380) (11 973) (11 020) (10 833)
ni;t > 10 6.9% 11.5% 13.4% 12.9%
(12 996) (8 299) (7 511) (7 325)
ni;t > 15 7.1% 12% 14% 13.4%
(10 706) (6 389) (5 598) (5 447)
ni;t > 20 7.3% 12.4% 14.7% 13.9%
(9 271) (5 087) (4 326) (4 199)
Medium capitalization rms
jGRSNj > k
k = 0 k = 0:05 k = 0:1 k = 0:15
ni;t > 5 6% 10.5% 11.9% 11.8%
(25 464) (13 583) (12 012) (11 719)
ni;t > 10 6.2% 11% 12.7% 12.6%
(16 117 (6 346) (5 279) (5 080)
ni;t > 15 6.3% 10.9% 13% 12.9%
(11 185) (3 526) (2 845) (2 697)
ni;t > 20 6.4% 10.9% 13% 12.9%
(8 054) (2 193) (1 681) (1 585)
Small capitalization rms
jGRSNj > k
k = 0 k = 0:05 k = 0:1 k = 0:15
ni;t > 5 7.7% 13% 14.9% 15.2%
(6 605) (2 541) (2 110) (2 029)
ni;t > 10 7.4% 13% 15.8% 16.5%
(3 113) (796) (569) (529)
ni;t > 15 7.2% 13.7% 17.1% 19%
(1 849) (328) (216) (193)
ni;t > 20 7.3% 13.7% 18.7% 20.9%
(1 154) (161) (95) (83)
Whatever the considered category, pi;t is calculated on the whole data set.
Figures in brackets indicate the number of quarter-stocks.
Table 4: Estimates of HLSV according to the market capitalization of rms
4.2.2 Herding intensity and stocks' geographical origin
Next we examine the hypothesis that institutional herding is greater in foreign stocks





































0lower precision earnings information from foreign rms and are more likely to dis-
regard this information if the consensus opinion is dierent. The information-based
and cascades models suggest that herding is more likely to occur when public and
private information is more dicult to obtain, to understand, and to use in portfolio
management. Thus, we should expect more pronounced herding in foreign stocks.
Fortunately, our dataset enables us to segregate our stock-quarters sample into three
groups on the base of geographical origin of the stock. The three groups are: French
rms, Euro-15 rms and others (foreign rms). Table 5 reports the institutional
herding measures we obtain for the three groups. As expected, herding is more
severe for foreign stocks than for French stocks (except for jGRSNj > 0). More
interestingly, herding is larger in Euro-15 stocks than in French stocks. French insti-
tutional investors know Euro-15 rms better than foreign rms, but less than French
rms. Thus, they herd much more in foreign and European stocks13.
13Again we have computed sell and buy side herding, but we found that they are not signicantly
dierent. We have also measured herding based on the betas of stocks (oensive and defensive
stocks). The results reveal no evidence that institutional herding in the French stock market in







































k = 0 k = 0:05 k = 0:1 k = 0:15
ni;t > 5 6.6% 11.6% 13.1% 12.9%
(27 379) (13 800) (11 885) (11 523)
ni;t > 10 6.7% 12.1% 13.9% 13.8%
(16 023) (5 814) (4 545) (4 422)
ni;t > 15 6.9% 12.4% 14.8% 14.9%
(10 631) (2 999) (2 158) (2 005)
ni;t > 20 7.2% 13.1% 16.2% 16.1%
(7 571) (1 616) (1 001) (894)
UE-15 rms
jGRSNj > k
k = 0 k = 0:05 k = 0:1 k = 0:15
ni;t > 5 6.2% 11.1% 12.4% 12.1%
(13 325) (8 752) (8 147) (8 029)
ni;t > 10 6.3% 11.7% 13.2% 12.9%
(9 404) (5 683) (5 166) (5 048)
ni;t > 15 6.4% 12.2% 13.8% 13.5%
(7 440) (4 114) (3 670) (3 572)
ni;t > 20 6.6% 12.8% 14.5% 14.1%
(6 087) (3 171) (2 755) (2 681)
French rms
jGRSNj > k
k = 0 k = 0:05 k = 0:1 k = 0:15
ni;t > 5 6.6% 9.5% 11.5% 11.1%
(9 545) (5 757) (5 286) (5 195)
ni;t > 10 6.7% 10.1% 12.5% 12%
(7 055) (4 014) (3 599) (3 514)
ni;t > 15 6.8% 11.3% 12.9% 12.2%
(5 810) (3 158) (2 852) (2 781)
ni;t > 20 6.9% 11.5% 13.2% 12.5%
(4 899) (2 670) (2 359) (2 305)
Whatever the considered category, pi;t is calculated on the whole data set.
Figures in brackets indicate the number of quarter-stocks.





































04.3 Herding intensity and stocks' return
Several papers indicate that positive feedback trading strategies (momentum invest-
ment strategies) are commonly followed by institutional investors (Grinblatt et al.
(1995) and Glaser & Weber (2004)). As institutional investors are subject to regular
performance evaluation and comparison to other funds, they are mainly interested in
short-term returns. Furthermore, institutional investors may trade in the same direc-
tion due to window dressing policies which consist in selling stocks with negative past
returns 'past losers'. Thus, we attempt in this section to investigate whether investor
trade together based on past returns. In other words, we determine whether institu-
tional herding is more common in stocks having low or high past returns. In Tables
6 and 7 we partition stocks in three groups of similar size (each group contains 1/3 of
the stocks' population) according to the returns of the last quarter. We distinguish
between buy-side herding and sell-side herding. Table 6 show that institutional herd-
ing is slightly larger among stocks having extreme past returns. Sell-herding is more
severe for low past-performance stocks. Whereas, Table 7 indicates that buy-herding
is more severe for high past-performance stocks. Thus, institutional investors in the
French stock market seem to use positive feedback strategies: they buy past winners
and sell past losers. Note however that comparison between Tables 6 and 7 suggest
that French institutional investors buy high past return stocks more frequently than
they low past return stocks. This nding oers new evidence of disposition eect in
the case of French fund managers. As they dislike incurring losses much more than
they enjoy making gains, investors hold stocks that have lost value and are impatient
to sell those stocks that have risen in value (Shefrin & Statman (1985)).
In short, our ndings suggest some evidence in favour of the positive feedback
trading strategies by French institutional investors. These investors seem to focus
on short-term returns. Furthermore, the window dressing strategies appear to being







































k = 0 k = 0:05 k = 0:1 k = 0:15
ni;t > 5 6.6% 8.3% 9.2% 9.7%
(8 249) (3 663) (3 168) (3 283)
ni;t > 10 6.6% 8.5% 9.5% 10.1%
(5 262) (1 967) (1 649) (1 705)
ni;t > 15 6.7% 8.5% 9.8% 10.5%
(3 895) (1 258) (1 011) (1 053)
ni;t > 20 6.9% 8.7% 10.2% 10.6%
(3 051) (913) (669) (697)
Medium pas-performance
jGRSNj > k
k = 0 k = 0:05 k = 0:1 k = 0:15
ni;t > 5 6.1% 6.9% 7.3% 7.3%
(8 609) (3 120) (2 636) (2 772)
ni;t > 10 6.2% 7.1% 7.4% 7.6%
(5 668) (1 654) (1 324) (1 415)
ni;t > 15 6.6% 7.3% 7.7% 7.8%
(4 266) (1 065) (829) (889)
ni;t > 20 6.6% 7.2% 7.4% 7.5%
(3 337) (756) (541) (592)
Large past-performance
jGRSNj > k
k = 0 k = 0:05 k = 0:1 k = 0:15
ni;t > 5 6% 7.2% 7.9% 8.2%
(8 311) (2 725) (2 175) (2 254)
ni;t > 10 6.2% 7.9% 9.2% 9.4%
(5 223) (1 307) (975) (1 016)
ni;t > 15 6.5% 8.4% 9.5% 6.6%
(3782) (811) (603) (634)
ni;t > 20 6.6% 8.5% 10.2% 10.3%
(2933) (555) (387) (410)
Whatever the considered category, pi;t is calculated on the whole data set.
Figures in brackets indicate the number of quarter-stocks.
Table 6: Estimates of sell-herding (HLSV calculated on stocks for which
Bi;t
ni;t < pt)







































k = 0 k = 0:05 k = 0:1 k = 0:15
ni;t > 5 5.7% 10.8% 12% 11.6%
(7 276) (5 074) (4 676) (4 386)
ni;t > 10 6% 11.2% 12.6% 12.1%
(4 834) (2 905) (2 557) (2 354)
ni;t > 15 6.2% 11.4% 13.1% 12.6%
(3 512) (1 940) (1 687) (1 544)
ni;t > 20 6.5% 11.9% 13.6% 13%
(2 733) (1 441) (1 255) (1 146)
Medium past-performance
jGRSNj > k
k = 0 k = 0:05 k = 0:1 k = 0:15
ni;t > 5 6.3% 12.1% 13.7% 13.4%
(8 265) (6 248) (5 738) (5 417)
ni;t > 10 6.4% 12.2% 14.3% 14%
(5 453) (3 608) (3 215) (2 988)
ni;t > 15 6.6% 12.7% 14.8% 14.5%
(4 050) (2 462) (2 140) 1 970)
ni;t > 20 6.8% 13.1% 15.5% 14.9%
(3 128 1 814 1 566 1 447
Large past-performance
jGRSNj > k
k = 0 k = 0:05 k = 0:1 k = 0:15
ni;t > 5 7.1% 14.1% 16.3% 15.9%
(8 779) (6 901) (6 374) (6 089)
ni;t > 10 7.2% 14.5% 17% 16.7%
(5 615) (3 777) (3 414) (3 233)
ni;t > 15 7.3% 14.4% 17.3% 16.8%
(4 083) (2 537) (2 224) (2 086)
ni;t > 20 7.3% 14.7% 17.6% 17.1%
(3 163) (1 831) (1 559) (1 452)
Whatever the considered category, pi;t is calculated on the whole data set.
Figures in brackets indicate the number of quarter-stocks.
Table 7: Estimates of buy-herding (HLSV calculated on stocks for which
Bi;t
ni;t > pt)






































5.1 Discussion on the FHW methodology
In a recent paper, Frey et al. (2007) examine the relevance of the LSV herding
measure. Using Monte Carlo simulations, they show that this measure is suited to
test whether herding exists or not. However, the authors establish that in case of
herding, using the LSV measure systematically underestimates herding. In fact, the
second term in LSV formula (adjustment term) is too high in case of positive herding.
According to their simulations, the bias in LSV is increasing with the herding level.
Furthermore, this bias depends on the number of traders in a stock-quarter. Thus,
comparisons of herding measures based of LSV indicator across stocks, periods, sub-
samples lead to potentially distorted results. Based on a simple model of trading,
Frey et al. (2007) introduce a new measure of herding, the FHW indicator. This
indicator goes from the basic idea of the LSV indicator and assesses the excess
dispersion of trades on the buy or the sell side in case of herding. However, they
use the second moment rather than the rst absolute moment. More precisely, the
herding level is measured by the normalized dierence between the empirical variance










The stronger herding, the higher the dierence between the empirical and theo-
retical variances. Table 11 in Appendix shows that our own Monte Carlo simulations
corroborate those of Frey et al. (2007) and suggest that the FHW herding measure
has better statistical proprieties than the traditional LSV measure. In short, the
LSV indicator should be used to test whether herding exists or not while the new
FHW indicator may be employed to measure the extent of herding as well as to make
comparisons across stocks, periods, and markets.
5.2 Using the FHW indicator
In what follows, we compare the herding levels by institutional investors in the
French stock market as measured by the traditional LSV indicator and the recent
FHW indicator. As suggested by our simulations, the LSV indicator systematically
underevaluates herding. Thus, this exercise enables us to empirically assess the bias
in herding when measured by the LSV indicator. Table 8 reports the overall levels
of herding by the institutional investors in the French stock market as measured by
FHW indicator. This table is to be compared with Table 2. As expected, FHW
herding measure is signicantly larger than that obtained by LSV indicator. Indeed,
the overall herding level rises from 6.5% to 16.50%. In contrast to results reported
in Table 2, the herding levels are not systematically increasing in the number of
traders on a given stock-quarter. The slight positive link between the herding levels





































0traditional LSV herding indicator (Frey et al. (2007)). Therefore, higher levels of
herding in stock-quarters traded by few institutional investors in the French stock
markets are only detected with the FHW measure of herding. Taken together, our
ndings are consistent with those of Frey et al. (2007) for institutional investors in
the German stock market.
More interestingly, the positive link between herding levels and fund trading
intensity as measured by the indicator we introduce in this paper (the GRSN) is
conrmed by the implementation of the new FHW herding measure. Indeed, Table 8
shows that the herding levels monotonically increase when the fund trading intensity
measured by GRSN rises.
Next, we brie
y discuss the results obtained using the FHW herding indicator
taking into account stocks characteristics14. Table 9 reports herding levels for small,
medium and large capitalization stocks. As shown by the traditional LSV measure,
institutional investors in the French stock market herd much more in small capital-
ization stocks. However, as we expect the LSV indicator underevaluates the herding
and the FHW herding levels are about 2.5 times stronger than those obtained em-
ploying the traditional LSV measure. More importantly, again herding measured by
FHW does not monotonically rises with the number of traders, but it does with the
fund trading intensity as assessed by GRSN. The results in Table 10 are consistent
with information-based and cascades models and corroborate those reported in Table
5: herding is more pronounced when public and private information is more dicult
to obtain. Thus, herding levels are considerably larger in foreign than in French
stocks.
jGRSNj > k
k = 0 k = 0:05 k = 0:1 k = 0:15
ni;t > 5 16.5% 21.5% 22.7% 23%
(50249) (28 309) (25 318) (24 747)
ni;t > 10 15.1% 20% 21.1% 21.4%
(32 482) (15 511) (13 410) (12 984)
ni;t > 15 14.6% 19.1% 20.6% 20.9%
(23 881) (10 271) (8 680 ) (8 358 )
ni;t > 20 14.3% 18.8% 20.1% 20.4%
(18 557) (7 457) (6 115) (5 880)
Whatever the considered category, pi;t is calculated on the whole data set.
Figures in brackets indicate the number of quarter-stocks.
Table 8: Estimates of HFHW
14Frey et al. (2007) do not propose specications of buy- versus sell-herding measures. Thus,








































k = 0 k = 0:05 k = 0:1 k = 0:15
ni;t > 5 16% 22.7% 24.6% 24.2%
(17 380) (11 973) (11 020) (10 833)
ni;t > 10 14.1% 21.7% 23.9% 23.6%
(12 996) (8 299) (7 511) (7 325)
ni;t > 15 14.7% 21.6% 23.9% 23.4%
(10 706) (6 389) (5 598) (5 447)
ni;t > 20 14.5% 21.6% 24% 23.5%
(9 271) (5 087) (4 326) (4 199)
Medium capitalization rms
jGRSNj > k
k = 0 k = 0:05 k = 0:1 k = 0:15
ni;t > 5 16.3% 23.7% 25.6% 25.5%
(25 464) (13 583) (12 012) (11 719)
ni;t > 10 15.1% 22.5% 24.5% 24.4%
(16 117) (6 346) (5 279) (5 080)
ni;t > 15 14.7% 21.4% 23.9% 23.8%
(11 185) (3 526) (2 845) (2 697)
ni;t > 20 14.3% 20.8% 23.2% 23.2%
(8 054) (2 193) (1 681) (1 585)
Small capitalization rms
jGRSNj > k
k = 0 k = 0:05 k = 0:1 k = 0:15
ni;t > 5 20% 28% 30.4% 30.7%
(6 605) (2 541) (2 110) (2 029)
ni;t > 10 17.6% 25.7% 28.9% 29.5%
(3 113) (796) (569) (529)
ni;t > 15 16.3% 25.8% 29.6% 31.4%
(1 849) (328) (216) (193)
ni;t > 20 15.8% 25.5% 30.7% 32.7%
(1 154) (161) (95) (83)
Whatever the considered category, pi;t is calculated on the whole data set.
Figures in brackets indicate the number of quarter-stocks.







































k = 0 k = 0:05 k = 0:1 k = 0:15
ni;t > 5 17.3% 25.2% 27.3% 27.2%
(27 379) (13 800) (11 885) (11 523)
ni;t > 10 15.7% 23.7% 26% 26%
(16 023) (5 814) (4 545) (4 422)
ni;t > 15 15.1% 23.1% 26.2% 26.4%
(10 631) (2 999) (2 158) (2 005)
ni;t > 20 14.9% 23.4% 27.1% 27.1%
(7 571) (1 616) (1 001) (894)
UE15 rms
jGRSNj > k
k = 0 k = 0:05 k = 0:1 k = 0:15
ni;t > 5 16.2% 23.3% 24.8% 24.6%
(13 325) (8 752) (8 147) (8 029)
ni;t > 10 15% 22.4% 24.2% 24%
(9 404) (5 683) (5 166) (5 048)
ni;t > 15 14.6% 22.3% 24.1% 23.8%
(7 440) (4 114) (3 670) (3 572)
ni;t > 20 14.4%v 22.4% 24.4% 24%
(6 087) (3 171) (2 755) (2 681)
French rms
jGRSNj > k
k = 0 k = 0:05 k = 0:1 k = 0:15
ni;t > 5 16.2% 20.5% 23.1% 22.7%
(9 545) (5 757) (5 286) (5 195)
ni;t > 10% 15% 19.8% 22.5% 22%
(7 055) (4 014) (3 599) (3 514)
ni;t > 15% 14.5% 19.3% 22.2% 21.7%
(5 810) (3 158) (2 852) (2 781)
ni;t > 20% 14.1% 18.9% 22% 21.5%
(4 899) (2 670) (2 359) (2 305)
Whatever the considered category, pi;t is calculated on the whole data set.
Figures in brackets indicate the number of quarter-stocks.
Table 10: Estimates of HFHW according to the geographical origin of rms
5.3 Conclusion
This paper oers the rst empirical investigation of herding by institutional investors





































0LSV indicator and the recent FHW indicator. We establish that the widely used LSV
indicator systematically underevaluates the herding and the FHW herding levels are
about 2.5 times stronger than those obtained employing the traditional LSV mea-
sure. Our empirical results show also that high levels of herding in stock-quarters
traded by few institutional investors are only detected with the FHW measure of
herding. More interestingly, based on the both measures we nd that herding levels
by French institutional investors are higher than those reported by previous empirical
investigations on developed stock markets. This nding is partly explained by the
institutional dierences between the French market and compared developed mar-
kets. On the other hand, our ndings suggest that herding does not monotonically
rises when the number of investors trading on a stock-quarter increases. However,
herding levels increase signicantly with our measure of the intensity of fund trading,
the GRSN.
Our other main ndings are consistent with those reported by most previous
works on developed stock markets. In particular, herding is stronger in small capital-
izations and in foreign stocks. These ndings might be attributed to less information
available and hence to institutional investors being more inclined to follow others or
the consensus. Some herding is also observed in large capitalization stocks likely be-
cause of informational herding as large capitalizations are closely followed by analysts
and investors. Indeed, the later relay on the same information. Finally, institutional
investors in the French stock market seem to use positive feedback strategies: they
buy past winners and sell past losers. However they buy high past return stocks
more they frequently sell low past return stocks.
There are several avenues for future research. First, further research should be
carried out in order to improve the available indicators of herding. Second, future
works should empirically assess the impact of herding by French institutional in-
vestors on stock prices. In other words, it would be too interesting to check whether
institutional herds is destabilising or stabilising stock markets in France. third, herd-
ing intensity and its impact on stock prices can be expected to vary across dierent
economic industries. Thus, a sectoral analysis of herding by institutional investors
in the French stock market would be informative. Finally, as our sample gathers
low-frequency data, it would be interesting to rene our investigation on herding







































Number of investors Number of stocks LSV 1st term of LSV 2nd term of LSV FHW
5 20 0.30% 19% 18.7% 0.9%
100 0.30% 19% 18.7% 2.2%
1000 0.40% 19.1% 18.7% 4.2%
20 20 0.80% 9.6% 8.8% 2.8%
100 0.90% 9.6% 8.8% 4.2%
1000 0.90% 9.7% 8.8% 5%
50 20 1.30% 6.9% 5.6% 4%
100 1.30% 6.9% 5.6% 4.9%
1000 1.40% 7% 5.60% 5%
True herding=15%
Number of investors Number of stocks LSV 1st term of LSV 2nd term of LSV FHW
5 20 3.3% 22% 18.7% 11.9%
100 3.30% 22.1% 18.8% 14.4%
1000 3.30% 22.1% 18.8% 15
20 20 7.10% 15.9% 8.8% 14.9%
100 7% 15.8% 8.8% 15%
1000 7% 15.8% 8.8% 15%
50 20 9.50% 15.1% 5.6% 14.9%
100 9.50% 15.1% 5.6% 15%
1000 9.40% 15.1% 5.7% 15%
True herding=30%
Number of investors Number of stocks LSV 1st term of LSV 2nd term of LSV FHW
5 20 12.70% 31.4% 18.7% 29.6%
100 12.70% 31.5% 18.8% 30%
1000 12.70% 31.4% 18.7% 30%
20 20 21.20% 30% 8.8% 30%
100 21.20% 30% 8.8% 30%
1000 21.20% 30% 8.8% 30%
50 2024.40% 30% 5.6% 30%
100 24.40% 30% 5.6% 30%
1000 24.40% 30% 5.6% 30%
Table 11: Monte-Carlo simulations
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